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Diﬀerentiation, Niche and Cost Leadership Strategies:
A Hotelling Based Analysis
Abstract
Costs are an important determinant of prices charged by firms. The primary purpose
of this paper is to study the impact of costs associated with diﬀerentiation and niche
strategies on firm’s positioning and pricing decisions in a horizontally diﬀerentiated mar-
ket. We analyze both sequential and simultaneous entry cases. In the sequential case, the
cost of diﬀerentiation is an additional cost incurred by the second entrant and it depends
on the degree of diﬀerentiation between itself and the first mover. The cost of following a
niche strategy is a market level cost aﬀecting both firms whereby firms incur a positive or
negative cost if they want to make a niche product. Our analysis provide some surprising
results, explains some conflicting empirical observations documented in previous research,
and may also be useful for further empirical research in this area by providing sharper
predictions about the impact of various types of costs on market outcomes. For exam-
ple, we find that under some circumstances the cost disadvantaged firm can enjoy higher
price-cost margins compared to the cost leader thereby suggesting that higher costs are
a blessing in disguise. We also show analytically that a firm following diﬀerentiated or
niche strategies charges a higher price than the cost leader if the cost of diﬀerentiated or
niche strategy is suﬃciently high and vice versa.
Keywords: Game Theory, Pricing, Diﬀerentiation, Niche Strategies, Cost Leadership,
Hotelling Models.
2
1 Introduction
Costs are an important determinant of prices charged by firms. It has been argued
that companies with lower costs gain competitive advantage by charging lower prices
whereas the ability to diﬀerentiate allows companies to charge higher prices (Porter 1985).
Furthermore, some companies are able charge higher prices by going after niche markets.
While these three strategies make intuitive sense, the details of how one goes about
executing with these strategies are not as unambiguous. One particular aspect that has
been questioned is how a cost leader should use its cost advantage in pricing decisions.
Tyagi (2001) argues that in horizontally diﬀerentiated markets, lower cost firms might
find it advantageous to charge higher prices in equilibrium. Indeed, there are instances
where a cost leader in a horizontally diﬀerentiated market might charge higher prices.
For example, it is often argued that P&G is the cost leader in many categories but often
charges higher prices in markets that typify horizontal diﬀerentiation. However, there is
evidence in previous empirical research (as well as some anecdotal evidence) suggesting
that cost leaders do charge lower prices even in a horizontally diﬀerentiated market.
Noble and Gruca (1999) surveyed pricing practices of 270 managers and found that in
competitive pricing situations, a cost advantaged firm (due to lower supplier cost) prices
lower than the competitor.
It is quite likely that whether and how costs (and cost diﬀerences across firms) impact
pricing decisions may depend on the type of costs that are being considered. Our objective
in this study is to take a closer look at diﬀerent types of costs and study their impact on
optimal pricing, positioning, and profits in a competitive setting. Recognizing that the
lists of costs that a firm incurs is numerous and it may be virtually impossible to include
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all types of costs in one study, as a starting point, we consider three types of costs.
1. Cost associated with diﬀerentiating one’s products from the competition:
Diﬀerentiation is the ultimate aim of many marketing strategies and is recognized as
a source of competitive advantage (Porter 1985). However, like many other things,
diﬀerentiation is usually not free. Hall (1980) in a study of 64 companies in eight
major industries found that many of the most profitable firms had achieved either
the lowest cost or the most diﬀerentiated positioning within their industry. Implicit
in this notion is that it is more expensive to make diﬀerentiated products. Horsky
and Nelson (1993) find some empirical evidence in the automobile market that a
new entrant has an incentive to diﬀerentiate to maximize profits even though it is
costly to diﬀerentiate. More specifically, we allow a component of cost to depend
on the degree to which a firm wants to diﬀerentiate itself from its competitors.
2. Cost of going after niche markets: Many firms tailor their products and services
to meet the needs of a narrow target segment. For example, organic products (e.g.,
organic milk) are preferred by niche consumers but are expensive to produce.1 More
specifically, we include a cost component that depends on how close is the product
to the centre of gravity of the customer preference distribution. There may be
instances where going after a niche consumer may be cheaper than going after the
median consumer. Our model allows for this possibility also.2
1http://www.grist.org/advice/ask/2006/05/22/costs/
2For example, the Classmate PC manufactured by Intel is an education-specific feature set targeted at
grade school students. The Classmate PC is cheaper to manufacture than the standard PC and satisfies
the needs of this niche market by providing them with an aﬀordable, collaborative learning environment.
See http://www.intel.com/intel/worldahead/classmatepc/
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3. Exogenous Costs: Finally, costs may also diﬀer across firms due to one firm
having access to a cheaper source of raw materials or labor. These diﬀerences are
not related to how a firm positions its products relative to competition or relative to
the preferences of the median consumer and have been studied in Tyagi (2000) and
Tyagi (2001). We include these in the model to maintain continuity with previous
research and also to examine how a cost advantage (or disadvantage) of this type
interacts with the ones described in #1 and # 2.
While cost of Type 3 have been studied extensively, we are not aware of any studies that
explicitly examine the impact of costs of Type 1 and Type 2. Our analysis separates out
how each of these costs aﬀects pricing, positioning, and profit outcomes in a competitive
setting. Our analysis provide some surprising results, explains some conflicting empirical
observations documented in previous research, and may also be useful for further empirical
research in this area by providing sharper predictions about the impact of various types
of costs on market outcomes. For example, we find that under some circumstances the
cost disadvantaged firm can enjoy higher price-cost margins compared to the cost leader.
Also, previous research considers only exogenous costs and shows that a firm with higher
exogenous cost charges a lower price. It is only by accounting for the cost of diﬀerentiation
or the cost of following niche strategies that we can explain the scenario where a firm with
higher cost positions itself as a niche or diﬀerentiated product and charges a higher price.
Specifically, in sequential games, we find that in markets where cost of diﬀerentiation,
or cost of following niche strategies is suﬃciently high, a second entrant prices higher
than the first entrant even if the first entrant has a cost advantage in terms of exogenous
costs where as if the cost of diﬀerentiation or cost of following niche strategies is low, a
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first entrant charges higher prices. We also show how cost of diﬀerentiation and cost of
following niche strategies interact with exogenous costs in determining firm positioning
and prices. Moreover, when such costs exists, we find conditions under which it is possible
for both the cost leader as well as the cost disadvantaged firm to make higher profits.
Hence, higher costs are a blessing in disguise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline the key features of our
competitive model in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze a model where firms enter
the market sequentially. In Section 4, we examine how the three types of costs aﬀect
pricing, positioning and profits when firms enter the market simultaneously. We conclude
in Section 5 with a summary, the limitations of our research, and possible directions for
future research.
2 The Model
We use the Hotelling framework (Hotelling 1929) and assume that the market consists
of two firms A and B, each oﬀering one product recognized by subscripts A and B
respectively. Firms first choose locations, and then choose prices. Given the locations
and prices, each consumer buys the product that maximizes their utility. We consider
both sequential as well as simultaneous entry of the firms. The specific model assumptions
are described below in greater detail.
1. We assume that the ideal points of consumers are distributed uniformly in the unit
interval [-0.5, 0.5] and the total number of consumers is normalized to 1.
2. We assume that the consumer reservation price, denoted by V , is the same for both
6
products A and B. V is assumed to be suﬃciently large so that all consumers buy
one of the two products.
3. Following Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Tyagi (2001), firms are not restricted to
locate within the interval of consumers’ ideal points i.e. within [-0.5, 0.5].
4. We assume that Firm B is located to the right of Firm A and the equilibrium
locations are denoted by bxA and bxB respectively. The equilibrium distance between
the two firms is given by bd = bxB − bxA.
5. Transportation cost is assumed to be quadratic with respect to distance. If a con-
sumer buys a product positioned at a distance y away from their ideal point and
priced at p, she gets a net utility of V − p− ty2, where V is the reservation price of
this consumer for the product and t > 0 is the transportation cost parameter.
6. We consider three components of cost that firms can potentially incur:
(a) Cost incurred to diﬀerentiate from its competitor: We assume that the
firm that wants to diﬀerentiate itself from competition bears a cost H(d). We
assume H(d) to be a twice diﬀerentiable increasing function of d, the distance
between the two firms. While some of our results are not dependent on the spe-
cific functional form of H, for much of our analysis we use a specific functional
form, H (d) = H (xB − xA)2 for mathematical tractability. This particular
representation has two desirable properties: (i) cost of diﬀerentiation is zero if
both firms have identical positioning in the market, and (ii) as the firms move
away from each other, the cost of diﬀerentiation increases.
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(b) The extent to which a firm wants to position towards niche or main-
stream consumers: We assume that each firm incurs a cost to move away
from (or closer to) the center of the consumer distribution. We represent this
cost parsimoniously by using a quadratic functional form, Gx2 where G is a
constant and x is the distance of the firm from the center of consumer distri-
bution. We allow G to be positive, negative, or zero.
(c) Exogenous Costs: We use FA and FB to represent all marginal costs that are
incurred irrespective of the firms positioning.
7. Once firms’ locations and prices are determined, we assume that the consumers have
perfect information about prices and locations. The consumer’s choice problem is to
purchase one and only one product from the firm which provides the highest utility.
8. We also assume that firms have perfect information about costs (both their own as
well as their competitors).
We start by focusing our attention on the sequential entry game. We later analyze
the simultaneous entry case also.
3 Sequential Move Analysis
We use backward induction to solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium in prices and
locations. We can express market shares of Firms A and B by considering the marginal
consumer, ex. The location of the marginal consumer is given by,
V − pB − t (xB − ex)2 = V − pA − t (ex− xA)2 . (1)
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All consumers to the left of the marginal consumer buy from Firm A where as all con-
sumers to the right of the marginal consumer buy from Firm B.
Let πA and πB represent the total profits of Firm A and Firm B respectively. The profits
are given by,
πA = [pA − cA]
∙
1 + xA + xB
2
+
pB − pA
2t (xB − xA)
¸
, (2)
πB = [pB − cB]
∙
1− xA − xB
2
− pB − pA
2t (xB − xA)
¸
. (3)
At the price competition stage, firms choose prices to maximize profits taking the equi-
librium positions to be a given. Solving the first order conditions of profit maximization
leads to the following prices,
pA =
1
3
£
2cA + cB + 3t (xB − xA) + t
¡
x2B − x2A
¢¤
, (4)
pB =
1
3
£
2cB + cA + 3t (b− a)− t
¡
x2B − x2A
¢¤
. (5)
Incorporating the prices given by (4) and (5) into the profit functions (2) and (3) gives
πA =
1
18t (xB − xA)
£
(cB − cA) + 3t (xB − xA) + t
¡
x2B − x2A
¢¤2
, (6)
πB =
1
18t (xB − xA)
£
(cB − cA)− 3t (xB − xA) + t
¡
x2B − x2A
¢¤2
. (7)
At the product positioning stage, Firms A and B choose locations to maximize profits.
Let us assume Firm A to be the first entrant and Firm B to be the second mover. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that the second mover always enters to the right of the
first mover.3 Also, for simplicity, let us define FA = 0 and FB = F (≥ 0). In other words,
3The analysis when the second mover enters to the left of the first mover is similar to the analysis of
this section and has been omitted.
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we restrict our analysis to the setting where the first mover is not cost disadvantaged.
Let us begin by considering the two cases considered in previous literature:
• Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) examine a case where there are no diﬀerences in costs
between the firms i.e. F = 0, G = 0, H = 0. In this case, the first entrant positions
at the center (bx = 0) and the second mover positions itself outside the distribution
of consumers (bxB = 1) and the firm prices are given by
pA =
4t
3
and pB =
2t
3
. (8)
• Tyagi (2000) analyzes the case where only the exogenous sources of cost diﬀerences
are considered. The analysis is restricted to (FB − FA) < 34t, to make sure that the
second firm is not so cost disadvantaged that it leaves the market. In such a setting,
if the first entrant has a lower cost then it positions at the center and the second
mover’s positioning depends on the magnitude of cost disadvantage borne by the
second mover. The firm prices are given by
pA =
1
3
"
4F
3
+ 2t+ 4t
r
1
4
+
F
3t
#
and pB =
1
3
"
5F
3
+ t+ 2t
r
1
4
+
F
3t
#
. (9)
In both cases above, the second entrant charges a lower price in equilibrium.
Tyagi (2000) considers exogenous costs, yet the higher cost firm charges a lower price
in equilibrium. So, the above models cannot explain the observed phenomenon in many
markets where niche or diﬀerentiated products are priced higher. What we shall show is
that once we allow for the fact that diﬀerentiation is expensive or that there is a cost to
follow a niche strategy and explicitly account for these costs, later entrants may charge
higher prices. We begin by accounting for the cost of diﬀerentiation.
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3.1 Cost of Diﬀerentiation
We model the cost of diﬀerentiation in a parsimonious model by considering a scenario
where the second mover’s cost depends on how much it is diﬀerentiated relative to the
competitor and study its impact on firm positioning, pricing and profits. Therefore, the
second mover incurs an additional cost over and above the exogenous cost to diﬀerentiate
its product from the first mover. We consider the cost of diﬀerentiation to be represented
by a quadratic function i.e. H (d) = H (xB − xA)2.
Let FB = F > 0, FA = 0. Hence, we are analyzing the case: F 6= 0, G = 0, H 6= 0.
Using the first order conditions for profit maximization for the second entrant and the
first entrant sequentially, the first entrant finds it optimal to position itself at the center
of the consumer distribution (See Technical Appendix A).
bxA = 0. (10)
Substituting, we can find the optimal position for the second mover, bxB, to be,
bxB = 1
6 (t+H)
h
3t+
p
9t2 + 12 (t+H)F
i
= βH . (11)
As F > 0 and H > 0, therefore, βH > 0. The second mover positions closer to the
center of the consumer distribution as the cost of diﬀerentiation increases. Using the
equilibrium locations in (10) and (11) and simplifying, the firm prices are given by,
pA =
1
3
£
F + (H + t)β2H + 3tβH
¤
, (12)
pB =
1
3
£
2F + 3tβH − tβ2H + 2Hβ2H
¤
. (13)
Therefore, the diﬀerence in prices can be given by,
pB − pA =
1
3
£
F + (H − 2t)β2H
¤
. (14)
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The firms diﬀerentiate less as H increases. As the second mover positions closer to the
first mover, the first mover has an incentive to lower price in order to increase its market
share. Hence, the first entrant prices lower.
Let us now consider the case where the firms have identical exogenous marginal cost i.e.
F = 0.
bxA = 0, (15)
bxB = t
H + t
. (16)
The diﬀerentiation between firms decreases as H increases. The prices are given by
pA =
4t2
3 (t+H)
, (17)
pB =
2t2
3 (t+H)
+
Ht2
(t+H)2
. (18)
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The second mover charges a higher price than the first mover if the cost
of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high (pB − pA > 0 if H > 2t) .
Proof: Follows from (17) and (18).
If only exogenous costs were considered, then higher cost firms would charge lower
prices in equilibrium. It is only by explicitly accounting for the cost of diﬀerentiation
that we are able to find conditions under which a higher cost firm charges a higher
price in equilibrium. Also, as we show later in the simultaneous move game, under some
conditions, the firm which incurs the diﬀerentiation cost enjoys a higher price-cost margin
compared to the cost leader.
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3.2 Cost of Niche Strategies
The cost of following a niche strategy essentially implies that costs increase as firms’ move
away from the center of consumer distribution. Let FB = F (> 0), FA = 0. Here, we are
considering the case: F 6= 0, G 6= 0, H = 0. By setting H = 0,we have
cA = Gx
2
A, (19)
cB = F +Gx
2
B. (20)
The optimal positioning is given by (See Technical Appendix B),
bxA = 0, (21)
bxB = 1
6
3t+
p
(9t2 + 12FG+ 12Ft)
G+ t
= βG. (22)
3.2.1 Case 1: Costly to go after Niche Consumers (G > 0).
Firms diﬀerentiate less if cost of following niche strategy increases i.e. G > 0. In this case,
the diﬀerences in prices is given by
pB − pA =
1
3
£
F + (G− 2t)β2G
¤
. (23)
If the firms have identical exogenous marginal cost (F = 0), then the optimal positioning
is given by (See Technical Appendix B),
bxA = 0, (24)
bxB = t
G+ t
. (25)
The first entrant positions at the center of consumer distribution and the diﬀerentiation
between firms decreases as G increases. The prices are given by,
pA =
4t2
3 (t+G)
, (26)
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pB =
2t2
3 (t+G)
+
Gt2
(t+G)2
. (27)
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The second mover follows a niche strategy and charges a higher price than
the first mover if the cost of following a niche strategy is suﬃciently high (pB − pA > 0 if
G > 2t).
Proof: Follows from (26) and (27).
It is necessary to incorporate the cost of niche strategies in the analysis to explain the
observed fact as to why a niche player might charge a higher prices in equilibrium. If we
ignore the cost of niche strategy, then the first mover positions at the center and charges
a higher price because of the positioning advantage that the first mover enjoys.
3.2.2 Case 2: Cheaper to go after Niche Consumers (G < 0).
In this case, the first entrant again positions at the center but the second entrant positions
further away compared to the setting where the cost of going after mainstream or niche
consumers is identical. The first entrant always charge a higher price than the second
entrant in equilibrium.
4 Simultaneous Move Analysis
We now analyze a game where firms enter the market and choose locations simultaneously
and then choose prices simultaneously. We again use backward induction to solve for the
sub-game perfect equilibrium in prices and locations. The firm profits in terms of the
firm locations are given in equations (6) and (7). We also assume that FB > FA in the
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analysis of the simultaneous game. Therefore, in the simultaneous model, Firm A is the
cost leader in terms of the exogenous costs.4
The case G = 0 and H = 0 is equivalent to the case analyzed in Tyagi (2001). In this
case, the cost diﬀerence between a leader and its competitor is driven only by exogenous
factors and there is no dependence of either firms cost on its position within the market.
For sake of completeness, we can solve for the equilibrium location to be the following
(See Technical Appendix C):
bxA = −3
4
+
FB − FA
3t
, (28)
bxB = 3
4
+
FB − FA
3t
. (29)
Given the above locations, we can solve for the diﬀerence in prices between the two
firms to be the following:
pA − pB =
FB − FA
3
> 0. (30)
If the cost advantage is exogenous in nature, Tyagi (2001) shows that in a horizontally
diﬀerentiated market, a cost leader prices higher than the competitor. We now include
the cost of diﬀerentiation and cost of following a niche strategy and study its impact on
pricing and profits in a simultaneous move game.
4.1 Cost of Diﬀerentiation
As earlier, we model cost of diﬀerentiation in a parsimonious model by considering a
scenario where cost leader’s advantage depends on how much it is diﬀerentiated relative
4We restrict attention to FB −FA < 9t4 , so that the cost disadvantaged firm doesn’t leave the market
completely.
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to the competitor and study its impact on firm positioning, pricing and profits. Therefore,
the cost disadvantaged firm incurs an additional cost over and above the exogenous cost
to diﬀerentiate its product from the cost leader. Mathematically, we have G = 0 and
H > 0 in our cost function i.e. let us assume cB = FB +H(d) and cA = FA.
In this case, the first order conditions of profit maximization leads to the following equi-
librium locations.
bxA = −3
4
+
(FB − FA)
3t
+
H
³bd´
3t
+
1
t
∙
dH (d)
dxA
¸
xA=bxA , (31)
bxB = 3
4
+
(FB − FA)
3t
+
H
³bd´
3t
− 1
t
∙
dH (d)
dxB
¸
xA=bxB . (32)
Also,
h
dH(d)
dxB
+ dH(d)
dxA
i
= 0 for any function H (d) which depends on the distance
(xB − xA) . Therefore, the diﬀerentiation between firms is independent of the cost of dif-
ferentiation i.e. bxB−bxA = 32 . The intuition for this surprising result is that the positioning
of the cost disadvantaged firm is driven by two opposing factors: (i) Price competition
increases at it comes closer (ii) Cost of diﬀerentiation increases as firm moves away from
the competitor. As diﬀerentiation costs increase, the cost disadvantaged firm comes closer
to the center of distribution. The cost leader finds it more profitable to move away from
the center in order to reduce price competition and increase its profits. Therefore, the
diﬀerentiation between firms remain the same.
Using the equilibrium locations in (31) and (32) and simplifying, the diﬀerence in the
equilibrium prices charged by the two firms is given by (See Technical Appendix C),
pB − pA =
1
3
⎡
⎣−(FB − FA)−H
³bd´+ 6
⎛
⎝
dH
³bd´
dxB
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ . (33)
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Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If diﬀerentiation costs constitutes a large fraction of total costs, then
the firm incurring the diﬀerentiation cost prices higher than its competitor. If exogenous
costs constitutes a large fraction of the total cost, then the firm with higher exogenous costs
prices lower than its competitor
µ
pB − pA T 0 for 6
µ
dH(bd)
dxB
¶
−H
³bd´ T (FB − FA)¶ .
Proof: Follows from (33).
We now take the simple functional form H (d) = H (xB − xA)2and solve for the cost
leaders’ pricing strategy as given in (33). Then equation (33) can be simplified to the
following:
pB − pA T 0 for
63
4
H T FB − FA. (34)
Therefore, a cost leader’s pricing strategy depends on which type of cost dominates.
If the cost is driven by cost of diﬀerentiation, then the cost disadvantaged firm has a
tendency to come closer to the center of the consumer distribution in equilibrium and
hence the cost leader has an incentive to charge lower prices in equilibrium.
Margin and Profit Comparison For the chosen functional form,H (d) = H (xB − xA)2,
the price-cost margins of the cost disadvantaged firm is higher than the cost leader if
H > 4
9
(FB − FA) . So if the cost of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high, then a cost disad-
vantaged firm enjoys a higher margin (See Technical Appendix D). As mentioned earlier,
when the cost of diﬀerentiation increases, it dominates the price competition eﬀect and
the cost disadvantaged firm comes closer to the center of the distribution. This, in turn,
forces the firm with lower costs to move away. So, a firm which incurs the diﬀerentiation
cost is able to charge a higher price and enjoy higher price-cost margins..
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The profits of the firms are given by,
πA =
1
27t
∙
2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
− 9
2
H
¸2
, (35)
πB =
1
27t
∙
−2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
+
9
2
H
¸2
. (36)
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In a horizontally diﬀerentiated market, the cost disadvantaged firm can
make higher profits than the cost leader if the cost of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high¡
4
9
(FB − FA) < H < 49 (FB − FA) + t
¢
.
Proof: See Technical Appendix D.
As H increases, both the margin and the market share of Firm B increases, and hence
Firm B’s profits increase. For 4
9
(FB − FA) < H < 49 (FB − FA) + t, both firms make
positive profits but Firm B makes higher profits than Firm A. For H > 4
9
(FB − FA) + t,
Firm A is driven out of the market (See Technical Appendix D).
4.2 Cost of Niche Strategies
We now analyze the impact of including the cost of niche strategies on firm positioning,
prices and profits when firms enter simultaneously. By setting H = 0, we have
cA = FA +Gx
2
A, (37)
cB = FB +Gx
2
B. (38)
4.2.1 Case 1: Costly to go after Niche Consumers (G > 0).
G > 0 represents the situation where it is more expensive to follow a niche strategy. We
can solve for the equilibrium location of the two firms (See Technical Appendix E). We
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find that as the cost of following a niche strategy increases, firms diﬀerentiate less in
the market but the diﬀerentiation between the firms is independent of the diﬀerences in
exogenous costs. Even when exogenous costs are high, the higher cost of following niche
strategies forces firms to reduce diﬀerentiation when the exogenous costs are identical.
bxA = − 3t
4 (t+G)
+
(FB − FA)
3t
, (39)
bxB = 3t
4 (t+G)
+
(FB − FA)
3t
, (40)
bxB − bxA = 3t
2 (t+G)
. (41)
Solving for the equilibrium prices, we find that the diﬀerence in the prices charged by the
cost leader and the competitor is given by
pA − pB =
1
3
∙
t− 2G
t+G
(FB − FA)
¸
. (42)
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In a horizontally diﬀerentiated market, the cost disadvantaged firm charges
a higher price in equilibrium and follows a niche strategy if the cost to follow a niche strat-
egy is higher than a threshold
¡
pB − pA > 0 if G > t2
¢
.
Proof: Follows from (42).
Our intuition for the above result is as follows: As G increases, firms make more
mainstream products. And as the cost disadvantaged firm comes closer to the center
of the consumer distribution, the cost leader gains higher profits by pricing lower and
capturing a greater market share. Therefore, when G > t
2
, the cost leader has an incentive
to price lower. Note that when firms have identical exogenous costs, then firms charge
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identical prices in equilibrium. So, the cost of niche strategy plays a role in the firms
pricing decision only when there exists an asymmetry between the firms exogenous costs.
This is an example of how cost of diﬀerent types interact with each other in determining
optimal positioning and prices.
Profit Comparison The firm profits are given by
πA =
(t+G)
27t2
∙
2 (FB − FA) +
9t2
2 (t+G)
¸2
, (43)
πB =
(t+G)
27t2
∙
−2 (FB − FA) +
9t2
2 (t+G)
¸2
. (44)
Note that the cost leader always makes higher profits than the competitor. But a
more interesting case is to compare the profits of the firms in a market where firms follow
niche strategies against the corresponding profits of firms when cost of following niche
strategies are ignored. Technical Appendix F shows the profit comparisons for both the
cost leader and for the cost disadvantaged firm. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If 9t
4
¡
t
t+G
¢1/2
< (FB − FA) < 9t4 , then both the cost leader as well as
the cost disadvantaged firm makes higher profits in markets where cost of niche strategies
exists compared to a benchmark setting where cost of niche strategies are not considered.
Proof: See Technical Appendix F.
The intuition for the results is as follows. IfG > 0, decisions are driven by two opposing
factors. Cost decreases as firms make more mainstream product but price competition
increases as they come closer. So, firms’ decision depends on the relative impact of these
two factors. When the diﬀerences in exogenous costs are low, each firm tries to reduce
its cost by moving closer to the center of the distribution of consumer preferences. This
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leads to more intense price competition which reduces firm profits. As the diﬀerences in
exogenous cost increase, the fear of price competition that each firm faces dominates the
decrease in cost associated with making a mainstream product as they come closer. So, it
requires the diﬀerences in exogenous sources of cost to be larger for the cost disadvantaged
firm to stay away, which in turn results in lower price competition. Consequently the
profits of both firms increase compared to the case where cost of niche strategies are not
considered.
4.2.2 Case 2: Cheaper to go after Niche Consumers (G < 0).
G < 0 represents the case where it is cheaper to follow a niche strategy.5 Using equa-
tion (41), we can see that as G becomes more and more negative, not surprisingly, firm
diﬀerentiation increases. From Equation (42) it can be readily seen that the cost leader
always charges a higher price in equilibrium. Also, for −t < G < 0, both firms make
higher profits compared to the setting where G = 0.
5 Conclusions
The primary purpose of this paper has been to study the impact of the cost of diﬀeren-
tiation and the cost of following a niche strategy on positioning and pricing decisions in
a horizontally diﬀerentiated market. We analyze both simultaneous and sequential entry
cases. The cost of diﬀerentiation is an additional cost incurred by a second entrant and
it depends on the degree of diﬀerentiation between itself and the first mover. The cost
of following a niche strategy is a market level cost factor aﬀecting both firms whereby
firms incur a positive or negative cost if they want to make a niche product. In sequential
5We restrict our attention to G > − t2 , so that cB > cA.
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games, we find that in markets where cost of diﬀerentiation, or cost of following niche
strategies is high, a first entrant prices lower than the second entrant even if the first
entrant has a cost advantage in terms of exogenous costs. In simultaneous games, our
results are consistent with the results obtained under sequential setting in the sense that
incorporating a cost of diﬀerentiation or a cost of following niche strategies forces a cost
leader to charge a lower price whenever the cost of diﬀerentiation or the cost of following
niche strategies is high.
We find that in simultaneous games, it is possible that both the cost leader as well
as the cost disadvantaged firm makes higher profits in settings where the cost of niche
strategies exist than when these costs don’t exist. We also find that if diﬀerentiation costs
are suﬃciently high, then the cost disadvantaged firm enjoys higher price-cost margins. In
other words, higher costs are a blessing in disguise. Unlike previous research, we are able
to show analytically that a firm which follows a niche or diﬀerentiated strategy actually
charges a higher price in equilibrium and also attains higher price cost margins. Our model
might be a good starting point for further empirical research in this area by providing
sharper predictions about the impact of various types of costs on market outcomes.
Our model has a number of limitations. We model the cost of diﬀerentiation as well
as the cost of following niche strategies using a specific functional form. We also allow
each firm to manufacture a single product, but firms may use a product line to reach
mainstream as well as niche markets. Extending the analysis to general functional form
of cost or analyzing the setting where firms have the ability to have multiple products
are interesting avenues for future research. Finally, we have restricted our attention to a
one dimensional product attribute space but firms can diﬀerentiate their products along
22
multiple dimensions. It might also be useful to extend the analysis into such settings in
future research.
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Technical Appendix
Appendix A
In this Appendix, we consider the sequential entry of firms. The second entrant not
only has a higher exogenous cost, it also faces a cost of diﬀerentiation i.e. F 6= 0, G = 0,
H 6= 0. Therefore, cB = F+ H (xB − xA)2 and cA = 0.
πB =
1
18t(xB−xA)
£
F +H (xB − xA)2 − 3t (xB − xA) + t (x2B − x2A)
¤2
dπB
dxB
= 0, implies
−2 (H + t) (xB − xA)2 + 2F = H (xB − xA)2 − 3t (xB − xA) + t (x2B − x2A) + F
Simplifying, we have
3 (H + t)xB = 3t+ (t+ 3H)xA +
F
xB−xA . Solving, the profit is maximized at
bxB = 1
6 (t+H)
∙
3t+ (6H + 4t) a+
q
(3t− 2ta)2 + 12 (t+H)F
¸
. (A.1)
Following the steps outlined in Appendix D, we find the FOC which maximizes the
first movers profits. Setting dπA
dxA
= 0, we find that Firm A’s profits is maximized at
bxA = 0. (A.2)
Substituting, we have
bxB = 1
6 (t+H)
h
3t+
p
9t2 + 12 (t+H)F
i
= βH (A.3)
Incorporating these equilibrium locations, the diﬀerence in prices is,
pB − pA =
1
3
£
F + (H − 2t)β2H
¤
. (A.4)
Substituting F = 0, bxA = 0 and bxB = tt+H and pB − pA = 13 [H − 2t] £ tt+H ¤2 .
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, we consider the sequential entry of firms. The second entrant not
only has a higher exogenous cost, it also faces a cost of making a niche product i.e. F 6= 0,
G 6= 0, H = 0. Therefore, cB = F +Gx2B and cA = Gx2A.
πB =
1
18t(xB−xA) [F − 3t (xB − xA) + (G+ t) (x
2
B − x2A)]
2
dπB
dxB
= 0, implies
36t [2GxB − 3t+ 2txB] [cB − cA − 3t (xB − xA) + t (x2B − x2A)] = 18t [cB − cA − 3t (xB − xA) + t (x2B − x2A)]
2
Therefore, 4GxB − 6t+ 4txB = FxB−xA − 3t+ (G+ t)xA
Simplifying, 3 (G+ t)xB =
F
xB−xA + 3t+ (G+ t)xA. Solving,
xB =
1
6 (t+G)
(3t+ 4 (t+G)xA −∆) , (B.1)
The profits for the second mover is maximized at bxB = 16(t+G) (3t+ 4 (t+G)xA +∆)
where ∆ =
q
(3t− 2 (G+ t)xA)2 + 12 (G+ t)F.
πA =
4
243t (G+ t)
[6 (G+ t)F + [3t+ (G+ t)xA] [3t− 2 (G+ t)xA +∆]]2
[3t− 2 (G+ t)xA +∆]
. (B.2)
The profit is maximized for the FOC of profit maximization yields the following:
bxA = 0 (B.3)
Substituting the value of bxA into the expression for xB, we get,
bxB = 1
6
3t+
p
(9t2 + 12FG+ 12Ft)
G+ t
= βG. (B.4)
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Substituting the values of bxA and bxB into the diﬀerences of prices, we get
pB − pA =
1
3
£
F + (G− 2t)β2G
¤
. (B.5)
Substituting F = 0, bxA = 0 and bxB = tt+G and pB − pA = 13 [G− 2t] £ tt+G¤2 .
Appendix C
Let cA = FA and cB = FB + H
³bd´ where H ³bd´ is a twice diﬀerentiable function.
The firm profits are given by
πA =
1
18t (xB − xA)
h
(FB − FA) +H
³bd´+ 3t (xB − xA) + t ¡x2B − x2A¢i2 , (C.1)
πB =
1
18t (xB − xA)
h
− (FB − FA)−H
³bd´+ 3t (xB − xA)− t ¡x2B − x2A¢i2 (C.2)
Setting the derivative of πA w.r.t a to zero and setting the derivative of πB w.r.t b to
zero, and solving the FOC’s for profit maximization we get
bxA = −3
4
+
(FB − FA)
3t
+
H
³bd´
3t
+
1
t
⎡
⎣
dH
³bd´
dxA
⎤
⎦ , (C.3)
bxB = 3
4
+
(FB − FA)
3t
+
H
³bd´
3t
− 1
t
⎡
⎣
dH
³bd´
dxB
⎤
⎦ . (C.4)
Therefore,
bxB − bxA = 3
2
− 1
t
⎡
⎣
dH
³bd´
dxB
+
dH
³bd´
dxA
⎤
⎦ (C.5)
Also,
∙
dH(bd)
dxB
+
dH(bd)
dxA
¸
= 0 for any function H
³bd´ which depends on the distance
(bxB − bxA) which leads to bxB − bxA = 32 .
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Substituting the values of the equilibrium locations, the diﬀerence in prices
pB − pA =
1
3
£
(cB − cA)− 2t
¡
x2B − x2A
¢¤
(C.6)
can be simplified to
pB − pA =
1
3
⎡
⎣− (FB − FA)−H (bxB − bxA) + 6
⎡
⎣
dH
³bd´
dxB
⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦ . (C.7)
Appendix D
For the functional form H (d) = H (xB − xA)2 , we have cB = FB +H (xB − xA)2 and
cA = FA. The equilibrium prices are given by
pA =
2
3
(FB − FA) +
3t
2
− 3H
2
, (D.1)
pB =
(FB − FA)
3
+
3t
2
+
15H
4
. (D.2)
The condition for the price-cost margins of the cost disadvantaged firm to be greater
than that of the cost leader is given by
−2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
+
9H
2
> 2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
− 9H
2
, i.e. (D.3)
FB − FA <
9H
4
. (D.4)
The market share of the two firms is given by:
Market Share Firm A =
1
2
− 2 (FB − FA)
9t
− H
2t
, (D.5)
Market Share Firm B =
1
2
+
2 (FB − FA)
9t
+
H
2t
. (D.6)
For both market shares to be positive, H < 4
9
(FB − FA) + t.
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Appendix E
Let cA = FA +Gx
2
A and cB = FB +Gx
2
B
Now firms A and B will choose locations to maximize firm profits.
cB − cA = (FB − FA) +G (x2B − x2A)
dπA
dxA
=
36t(xB−xA)[(FB−FA)+(G+t)(x2B−x2A)+3t(xB−xA)][−2GxA−3t−2xAt]+18t[(FB−FA)+(G+t)(x2B−x2A)+3t(xB−xA)]
2
[18t(xN−xA)]2
dπB
dxB
=
36t(xB−xA)[(FA−FB)−(G+t)(x2B−x2A)+3t(xB−xA)][−2GxB+3t−2xBt]−18t[(FA−FB)−(G+t)(x2B−x2A)+3t(xB−xA)]
2
[18t(xB−xA)]2
Setting the derivative of πA w.r.t a to zero and setting the derivative of πB w.r.t b to
zero, and solving the FOC’s for profit maximization we get
xA = −
3t
4 (t+G)
+
FB − FA
3t
, (E.1)
xB =
3t
4 (t+G)
+
FB − FA
3t
. (E.2)
Substituting these expressions into the pricing function, we get
pA − pB =
1
3
£
(cA − cB) + 2t
¡
x2B − x2A
¢¤
i.e. (E.3)
pA − pB =
1
3
∙
(2t−G)
t+G
(FB − FA)− (FB − FA)
¸
(E.4)
The profit functions are the following:
πA =
(t+G)
27t2
∙
2 (FB − FA) +
9t2
2 (t+G)
¸2
, (E.5)
πB =
(t+G)
27t2
∙
−2 (FB − FA) +
9t2
2 (t+G)
¸2
(E.6)
Substituting G = 0 into (A.1), (A.2) and (A.4) gives (11), (12) and (13).
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Appendix F
Profit comparisons:
Case 1: G > 0 :
We compare the profits of the cost leader when we account for the cost of following
niche strategy against the profits of the cost leader when such costs are ignored. We see
that profits under the former case is higher than the latter when,
(t+G)
27t2
∙
2 (FB − FA) +
9t2
2 (t+G)
¸2
>
1
27t
∙
2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
¸2
, (F.1)
2 (FB − FA)
"
1−
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2#
>
9t
2
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2 "
1−
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2#
, (F.2)
FB − FA >
9t
4
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2
(F.3)
Now let us consider the profits of the cost disadvantaged firm. We consider two cases:
Case 1: FB − FA < 9t
2
4(t+G)
Then, for the cost disadvantaged firm to make higher profits, the inequality to be
satisfied is,
9t2
2 (t+G)
− 2 (FB − FA) >
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2 ∙
−2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
¸
i.e., (F.4)
9t
2
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2 "µ
t
t+G
¶1/2
− 1
#
> 2 (FB − FA)
"
1−
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2#
. (F.5)
As can be readily seen, there are no values of FB − FA in the range that we have
considered, such that the above inequality is satisfied. So, a cost disadvantaged firm
makes lower profits than when we ignore cost of following niche strategy.
Case 2: 9t
2
4(t+G)
< FB − FA < 9t4
Then, for the cost disadvantaged firm to make higher profits, the inequality to be
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satisfied is,
2 (FB − FA)−
9t2
2 (t+G)
>
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2 ∙
−2 (FB − FA) +
9t
2
¸
i.e., (F.6)
(FB − FA) >
9t
4
µ
t
t+G
¶1/2
(F.7)
Therefore, a cost disadvantaged firm also makes higher profits when 9t
4
¡
t
t+G
¢1/2
<
(FB − FA) < 9t4 .
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